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SEEKING REDRESS FOR GENDER-BASED BIAS





Efforts to incorporate gender-based bias crimes into hate crime
schemes have been met with both great progress and discouraging set-
backs in recent years. While it should seem self-evident that gender
animus can trigger bias-motivated violence much like attacks based on
other forms of prejudice, legal recognition of gender-motivated violence
as a civil rights violation has developed slowly. Until 1994, when Con-
gress enacted the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA),' there was no federal redress for gender-based violence
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1. Codified as Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-Motivated Violence Act, 42
U.S.C. 5 13981 (1994). The Civil Rights Remedy established that "all persons within
the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by
gender .... " 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b). It provided for recovery of compensatory or puni-
tive damages, as well as injunctive or declaratory relief for victims of such crimes. 42
U.S.C. § 13981(c). To prevail, plaintiffs had to establish that they were the victims of a
crime of violence that rose to the level of a felony, and that the act was gender motivated.
42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1)-(2).
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committed by private individuals outside the workplace. 2 In enacting this
law, Congress recognized that gender-motivated violence violates
women's civil rights,3 and that crimes such as domestic violence, rape,
and sexual assault are frequently hate crimes just like other forms of dis-
criminatory violence.
4
Notwithstanding Congress's strong endorsement of women's right
to be free from gender-motivated violence, in May 2000, in United States
v. Morrison,' the Supreme Court struck down the VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy as beyond Congress's power to legislate under either the
Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
law's constitutionality and the Morrison decision have garnered public
attention and debate focused primarily on the Court's increased scrutiny
of Congressional power.6 The legacy of the VAWA Civil Rights Rem-
edy undoubtedly will surround its constitutionality. Nevertheless, cases
decided under the Remedy prior to Morrison will continue to have reso-
nance to the extent that the decisions addressed what constitutes a gender-
motivated hate crime. Consequently, while the 1994 Civil Rights Remedy
no longer is available to victims of gender-motivated crimes, cases decided
under the law created an important body of caselaw that can provide a
2. Before the Civil Rights Remedy was enacted, federal law provided civil rights
redress for acts of gender-motivated violence committed by state officials, at work, or as
part of a conspiracy to deprive the victim of her civil rights, but none covered the most
common form of gender-motivated violence-that committed by private individuals.
3. While both men and women can be the victims of gender-based violence, this
Essay shall refer to the victims of such violence in the feminine, since women are the
primary victims of such crimes. Notably, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy was drafted
in gender-neutral terms.
4. Congress stated that "[p]lacing this violence in the context of the civil rights laws
recognizes it for what it is--a hate crime." S. REP. No. 103-138, at 49 (1993) (citation
omitted). It further found that:
Whether the attack is motivated by racial bias, ethnic bias, or gender
bias, the results are often the same. The victims of such violence are re-
duced to symbols of hatred; they are chosen not because of who they are
as individuals but because of their class status. The violence not only
wounds physically, it degrades and terrorizes, instilling fear and inhibiting
the lives of all those similarly situated.
Id.
5. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
6. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Justices Reject Lawsuits for Rape; Court Again Limits Con-
gress's Power, WASH. POST, May 16, 2000, at Al; Marcia Coyle, What's Left After
'Morrison', NAT'L L.J., May 29, 2000, at Al; Jan Crawford Greenburg, High Court Ruling
Further Clips the Role of Congress, Cm. TRIB., May 16, 2000, at Al; David G. Savage, High
Court Rejects U.S. Allowing Civil Suits in Rapes, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2000, at Al; States'
Business, WASH. POST, May 16, 2000, at A20; Turning Back a Federal Intrusion, CHI. TRIB.,
May 16, 2000, at A14.
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foundation for redressing gender-based crimes under alternative statutory
schemes.
Despite its similarity to other forms of bias crime, the question of
what constitutes a gender-motivated bias crime has confounded legisla-
tors and policymakers. Objections to recognizing gender-based violence
as a civil rights violation range from the concern that such recognition
would open the floodgates to an overwhelming number of cases, to the
argument that no such regulation is necessary because it is impossible to
distinguish gender-based crimes from those based on lust or personality.
Legislators debating the Civil Rights Remedy before its enactment made
clear that the law would cover only cases that were gender-motivated, as
distinct, for example, from purported "ordinary" acts of domestic violence
or "random" crimes. 8 Nevertheless, cases decided under the Remedy
reveal that courts drew upon other familiar bodies of anti-discrimination
law to evaluate whether and when allegations involving violence against
women contained sufficient evidence of bias to warrant civil rights en-
forcement. 9 These cases therefore illustrate the kinds of circumstances in
which violence against women can be deemed to constitute a form of
discrimination, and exemplify how courts can evaluate such claims in the
future under state, local, or alternative federal anti-bias laws.
This Essay will analyze how courts have defined gender-motivation,
focusing on the Civil Rights Remedy cases decided before the law was
struck down, in an attempt to cull from those cases the standards federal
courts have used to assess gender-motivation. The article will first pro-
vide an overview of existing and proposed laws that offer some form of
redress for gender-motivated crimes. It will then analyze cases decided
under the Civil Rights Remedy, focusing on two key issues that have
arisen as policymakers struggle with whether and how gender-based bias
crimes fit in the rubric of hate crimes legislation. The first of these issues
is how courts have assessed whether claims of domestic violence reflect
discriminatory motivation, and what type of evidence they have found
useful in that context. The second issue is how courts treated VAWA
civil rights claims based on allegations of sexual assault, and what, if any,
evidence, in addition to allegations of sexual assault, they found to indi-
cate gender-motivation.
7. See Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful Paradigm
for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN's LJ. 123 (1999).
8. See S. RrEp. No. 102-197, at 69 (1991) (statement of Senator Biden that the law
would not cover "everyday" domestic violence).
9. See infra notes 36-89 and accompanying text.
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I. LEGISLATIVE OVERVIEW
The Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy was
historic in that, through it, Congress announced, for the first time, that
violent crimes motivated by the victim's gender are discriminatory and
violate the victim's federal civil rights. 10 However, the legislative debate
that preceded the law's enactment reflected legislators' concerns that not
every act of violence against women, but rather, only those that were
gender-motivated, be deemed a civil rights violation subject to federal
redress." As a result, the statute defined gender-motivation to require
that plaintiffs prove the violent act was committed "because of gender or
on the basis of gender" and "due, at least in part, to an animus based on
the victim's gender."' 2 Congress specifically limited the reach of the law
to cases based on gender-motivated crimes, rather than on "random" acts
of violence against women.
13
10. The Civil Rights Remedy stated:
(b) All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free
from crimes of violence motivated by gender . .. (c) A person (including
a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence motivated
by gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection
(b) of this section shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the
recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and de-
claratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (b)-(c).
11. See generally Victoria F. Nourse, Mhere Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet:
The Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1996)
12. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (d)(1). Throughout this Essay, in discussing the Civil Rights
Remedy, the terms "gender" and "sex" are used interchangeably. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals recognized the functional interchangeability of these terms in Schwenk
v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000). In that case, the court referenced Congress's
explicit modeling of the Civil Rights Remedy on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and adopted the Supreme Court's analysis in the Title VII context that "sex"
"encompasses both sex-that is, the biological differences between men and women-
and gender." See id. at 1202 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240
(1989)). The Court in Price Waterhouse held that the statute's prohibition of sex discrimi-
nation includes discrimination because one fails to act in the way expected of a man or a
woman. See id. at 1202. The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Schwenk reflects the important
recognition that sexual stereotypes can result in discrimination transcending the bounds of
biological identity. For example, individuals who are not biologically female can suffer
sex discrimination if they do not conform to the gender roles assigned to their biological
identity. See generally Mary Ann C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orien-
tation: the Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 86-94
(1995).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(1) states:
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While the Supreme Court in Morrison struck down the VAWA
Civil Rights Remedy on constitutional grounds, the question of when
gender-based crimes warrant civil rights treatment remains alive as vic-
tims seek alternative avenues of relief. Legislative proposals have been
introduced in Congress that would create a cause of action that retains
the essential elements of the 1994 VAWA Civil Rights Remedy-
providing civil redress for gender-motivated crimes-but would require
that each case involve some explicit link to commercial activity. 4 If
enacted, that law unquestionably would afford more limited relief than
the 1994 law, but it would nevertheless provide a basis for federal civil
rights recovery. Other than the invalidated Civil Rights Remedy, the
only federal bias crime law currently in place that recognizes gender-
based bias crimes is a provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, which directs the United States Sentencing
Commission to enhance sentences for bias-motivated crimes, including
those based on gender."5 Yet only one reported decision has addressed
whether a crime was gender-motivated under the terms of the Act, and
that court rejected the claim under reasoning that appears contrary to
Supreme Court precedent.
16
Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action under sub-
section (c) of this section for random acts of violence unrelated to gender
or for acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, to be motivated by gender (Within the meaning of subsection (d)
of this section).
Id.
14. H.R. 5021, 106th Cong. (2000). In addition, the law would enable the United
States Department ofJustice to intervene upon a showing that local authorities' response
to gender-based crimes was discriminatory. Id.
15. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2096, § 280003(b) (pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
994). This law applies to bias crimes based on actual or perceived race, color, religion,
national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation. In May 1995, the
Sentencing Commission announced that a three-level sentencing guidelines increase for
hate crimes would take effect on November 1, 1995. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
§ 3A1.1 (1995).
16. In United States v. Boylan, 5 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.NJ. 1998), a municipal court
judge was alleged to have coached single, poor, Hispanic or light-skinned Black female
municipal court defendants charged with traffic violations to lie about their offenses in
order to get reduced fines and penalties in return for sexual favors. The court declined to
treat the judge's crime as a hate crime for sentencing purposes, because it was not per-
suaded that "the primary motivation for the offense was a hatred of the municipal court
defendants." Id. at 283. That reasoning is incorrect in at least two respects. First, the
court confused "hatred" with the discriminatory bias with which the sentencing guide-
lines are concerned. The Supreme Court has recognized that discriminatory motivation is
distinct from maliciousness or hatred. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
506 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1993). In addition, the court's factual analysis failed to evaluate
whether the judge's treatment of the defendants was informed by their gender or racial
SPRING 2001]
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Substantive federal criminal law permits federal prosecution of cer-
tain bias crimes based on race, color, religion, or national origin, and the
federal Hate Crimes Statistics Act requires reporting of hate crimes based
on these categories as well as on sexual orientation and disability." Nei-
ther cover bias crimes based on gender. In June 2000, the Senate passed
the Hate Crimes Prevention Act (HCPA), an amendment to the current
hate crimes law." That legislation would strengthen the existing hate
crimes law by permitting federal criminal prosecution of bias crimes
committed because of a person's real or perceived sexual orientation,
gender, or disability, and by removing overly restrictive jurisdictional
obstacles to federal involvement. 9 A similar amendment has been intro-
duced in the House of Representatives. In legislative hearings
addressing the scope of the acts that would be covered under the HCPA,
supporters urged that gender-motivation be assessed using the same type
of inquiry specified under the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy and em-
21ployed in other discrimination and bias crime cases.
At the state level, while some state laws provide redress for gender-
motivated violence, coverage is far from uniform and the laws have not
been widely used. As of 1999, 40 states and the District of Columbia had
enacted some form of bias crime law, but only 19 included a provision
for gender-bias crimes. 22 Ten states and the District of Columbia provide
identity. Accordingly, the decision sheds no light on the extent to which gender will be
considered as a motivating factor that can influence sentencing in criminal cases.
17. See Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990)
(pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 534). For a comprehensive analysis of case law analyzing bias-
motivation under federal and state law, see Goldscheid, supra note 7.
18. Sponsored by Senators Kennedy (D-MA) and Smith (R-OR), the "Local Law
Enforcement Enhancement Act" passed as an amendment to the Defense Authorization
bill. Local Law Enforcement Act, S. 2550, 106th Cong. (2000). Similar bills have been
introduced in the 107th Congress. See, e.g., Local Law Enforcement Act of 2001, S. 625,
107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001); Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of
2001, H.R. 1343, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001).
19. See Hate Crimes Statistics Act. Currently, the federal hate crime bill permits
federal prosecution of hate crimes based on race, color, religion or national origin that
interfere with the target's enjoyment of one of the federal rights enumerated in the
statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2000).
20. H.R. 1082, 106th Cong. (1999).
21. See Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1997: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary on H.R. 3081, 105th Cong. 80-86 (1998) (statement of Kathryn J. Rodgers,
Executive Director, NOW Legal Defense); Hate Crimes Violence: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on theJudiciary, 106th Cong. 50-51 (1999) (statement of Fredrick M. Lawrence,
Professor of Law, Boston University). See also FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING
HATE: BIAS CRIME UNDER AMERICAN LAW 14-17 (1999) (discussing whether gender
should be included in bias crime laws).
22. For a current tracking of which states have enacted bias crime laws see Anti-
Defamation League, Hate Crimes Laws: State Hate Crimes/Statutory Provisions (2001), at
http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/provisions.html.
[VOL. 6:265
SPRING 2001] Seeking Redress
civil remedies for victims of gender-bias crimes.23 Yet despite these civil
remedies, there are no reported decisions awarding civil relief to a victim
of a gender-motivated crime. 24 In the wake of the Morrison ruling, several
state legislatures have considered state civil rights provisions with lan-
guage tracking that of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy. 25 New York
26City enacted such a law in December 2000. This legislative activity
illustrates the enduring interest in legislative redress for gender-based bias
crimes and the consequent vitality ofjudicial inquiries into the nature of
gender-motivation.
II. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AS GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE
Concerned about limiting the cases subject to federal jurisdiction,
Congress incorporated two elements of proof in the VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy. A plaintiff first had to establish that she was the victim of a
"crime of violence" of sufficient severity.27 In addition, she had to prove
23. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 52(b) (2000); D.C. Code Ann. § 22-4004(1999); 720 I11.
Comp. Stat. 5/12-7.1(c) (2000); Iowa Code 5 729A.5 (1999); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 12,
§ 111(2000); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.147b (2000); Minn. Star. § 611A.79(1999); NJ.
Stat. Ann. 5 2A:53A-21 (2000); N.C. Gen. Stat. 5 99D-l(b) (1999); Vt. Star. Ann. tit.
13, § 1457 (2000); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.36.083 (2000); see also Clare Dalton,
Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEw ENG. L.
Rav. 319 (1997) (discussing use of state tort law to achieve redress for gender-based
violence).
24. Those cases discussing the states' civil remedy generally disposed of the plaintiffs'
claims on procedural or other grounds. See, e.g., Harris v. Franklin-Williamson Human
Services, Inc. 97 F. Supp. 2d 892, 910-13 (S.D. III. 2000) (refusing to analyze plaintiff's
claim under the Illinois Hate Crimes statute because of attorney's alleged bad faith
pleading); Damato v. Jack Phelan Chevrolet Geo, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 283, 292 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (finding that plaintiff's claims under Illinois Hate Crimes statute for sexual assault in
the workplace are preempted by the Illinois Human Rights Act); Doe v. Purity Supreme,
Inc., No. 93-6530, 1994 Mass. Super. LEXIS 505, at *6-7 (Mass. Super. 1994)
(precluding plaintiffs claims under Massachusetts' civil remedy against her supervisor for
rape because of the applicability of an employment discrimination statute); Clarke v.
Kentucky Fried Chicken of California, Inc., No. 94-11101-EFH, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20967, at *5 (D. Mass. 1994) (same).
25. See S.B. 7903, 1999 Leg. 223rd Sess. (N.Y. 1999); S.B. 1535, 44th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2000); H.B. 4407, 91st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1999).
26. Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act, N.Y. City Admin. Code
§§ 8-901-8-907 (2000).
27. See 42 U.S.C. 13981(d)(2). The Statute contains a two-part definition of "crime
of violence." First, the plaintiff must establish that the "act or series of acts ... would
constitute a felony against the person" or "against property if the conduct presents a
serious risk of physical injury to another." 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2)(A). In addition, the
act must come within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16 (1994) ("Section 16"), a federal
statute defining a "crime of violence" that has been used principally in the sentencing
context. The Section 16 definition bolsters the Civil Rights Remedy's requirement that
only sufficiently violent acts will be covered, by providing that the predicate felony
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
that the act was "motivated by gender. ' 2' This section of the Essay ex-
amines how courts interpreted the gender-motivation element of claims
brought under the Civil Rights Remedy. In requiring proof of the
connection between the defendant's violent acts and the victim's gender,
the gender-motivation requirement itself had two parts. The victim had
to prove that the violent act was committed: (1) "because of gender or
on the basis of gender," and (2) "due, at least in part, to an animus based
on the victim's gender. ' '29 That two-part analysis notwithstanding, the
legislative history indicated that the statutory elements were drafted with
the goal of ensuring that only gender-motivated violent acts, rather than
"random" acts of violence, warrant recovery. Courts addressing the
"animus" and "because of gender" determinations similarly addressed the
two as a single inquiry.3' One court went so far as to reject defendant's
argument that gender-motivation must be proven according to a height-
ened standard because of the "animus" language, further supporting the
32
singular inquiry.
Congress intended the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy's gender-
motivation element to be treated much like "bias" elements contained in
other federal civil rights laws. According to Congress, proof of gender-
motivation under the Civil Rights Remedy would "proceed in the
same ways proof of race or sex discrimination proceeds under other
statute must either contain the use or threatened use of force as an element, or must
present a substantial risk that force will be used. See id. Numerous courts considered
whether allegations of violence against women satisfy this requirement. Compare e.g., Liu
v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999); Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601
(E.D. Wash. 1998); Kuhn v. Kuhn, No. 98 C 2395, 1998 WL 673629 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
16, 1998); Timm v. DeLong, 59 F. Supp. 2d 944 (D. Neb., 1998); Brzonkala v. Va.
Polytechnic & State University, 935 F. Supp. 779, 784 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd on other
grounds, United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F.
Supp. 531, 541 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (concluding that complaints satisfied crime of violence
element), with Doe v. Hartz, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998); Palazzolo v. Russiano, 993
F. Supp. 45 (D.R.I. 1998); Smathers v. Webb, No. 98-5806, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
29993 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 1999) (concluding that complaints did not satisfy the crime of
violence element). The plaintiff was not required, however, to prove that there was a
previous criminal complaint, prosecution, or conviction stemming from the attack. See 42
U.S.C. § 13981(e)(2).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1).
29. Id.
30. For example, the 1993 Senate Report treats "proof of gender-motivation" as a
single statutory element. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 52 (1993).
31. See, e.g., Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000); Liu v.
Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452, 474 (D.R.I. 1999).
32. Truong v. Smith, No. 98-B-332, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21327, slip op. at 6 (D.
Colo. April 13, 1999).
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civil rights laws., 33 Congress specifically referenced caselaw interpreting
statutes such as 42 U.S.C. % 1981, 1983, 1985(3) and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as sources of the type of circumstantial evi-
dence that could help establish that an act was "gender-motivated" rather
than "random.,
34
The Civil Rights Remedy was built on a long history of federal
legislative interventions to redress bias-motivated conduct. Both federal
and state courts routinely analyze cases involving harassment and vio-
lence, using circumstantial evidence to determine whether the conduct at
• 35
issue was motivated by bias. In those cases, as well as cases litigated
under the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, the type of evidence found
reflective of bias is remarkably consistent regardless of the particular
statutory formulation at issue or the forum in which the case was heard.
Courts infer discriminatory motivation from evidence such as epithets,
patterns of behavior, statements evincing bias, and other circumstantial as
well as direct evidence reflecting gender-based bias. Although the vol-
ume of caselaw is not extensive, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy cases
reveal that courts followed Congress's direction regarding what type of
evidence to use to assess gender-motivation.
A. Gender-bias in Domestic Violence Cases
Many of the reported decisions involving VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy claims stem from circumstances involving domestic violence,
but only three of those decisions directly addressed the gender-36 37
motivation elements. In Ziegler v. Ziegler, a federal district court in
Washington found ample evidence of gender bias to support a VAWA
civil rights claim. 38 In addition to allegations of rape, the court cited the
following evidence: gender-specific epithets and acts that perpetuated
stereotypes of women's submissive roles, such as defendant's controlling
all of the family's financial information and documents, holding all of
33. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 52 (1993).
34. Id.
35. See Goldscheid, supra note 7, at 132-42.
36. Most of the reported Civil Rights Remedy cases involving domestic violence
addressed whether the law was constitutional or whether the plaintiff satisfied the "crime
of violence" requirement for stating a claim under the law. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Kuhn, No.
98C 2395, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 1999); Bergeron v.
Bergeron, No. 96-3445-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8181 (M.D. La. May 28, 1999);
Timm v. DeLong, 59 F. Supp. 2d 944 (D. Neb. 1998); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp.
1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
37. No. CS-97-0467-WFN, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18180, (E.D. Wash. Sept. 24,
1998).
38. Id. at "10-11
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plaintiff's personal documents such as her passport, not placing her name
on title documents, not disclosing insurance information to her, and
becoming angry if she questioned him about the family affairs.3 9 Applying
40the standards identified by Congress for recognizing hate crimes, the
court relied on evidence of severe and excessive attacks on the plaintiff,
especially during her pregnancy, and allegations that the violence was
often without provocation and specifically at times when the plaintiff
asserted her independence. While acknowledging that "there may be
many causes of violence within a marital relationship," the court found
that the alleged facts "present more than conclusory allegations" and
42
supported an inference of gender-motivation.
A Northern District of Illinois court found allegations of marital
rape probative of gender-motivation. In Kuhn v. Kuhn,'43 the court refer-
enced and agreed with two other district court decisions, both of which
recognized that alleged criminal sexual assaults are generally motivated by
gender. . Specifically, the Kuhn court concluded that "[w]e too have little
doubt that an alleged criminal sexual assault is motivated by gender and
that cases in which a criminal sexual assault is not motivated by gender
are few and far between. 4 5 The court suggested it might find subtle
difficulties in other domestic violence cases when it stated that "[t]he
interplay between plaintiffs gender and her status as a wife will require a
greater evidentiary exposition. 4 6 However, at the time the Supreme
Court struck down the Civil Rights Remedy, no court had provided
any greater analysis of defendants' frequent arguments that purported
violence was because the target was his wife rather than a woman.
The third decision to address gender-motivation summarily rejected
the claim, but did so because the plaintiff failed to allege that the acts of
violence constituted a felony.47 Nothing in the decision indicates that the
complaint included any evidence of gender-motivation beyond the allega-
tions of domestic violence. Given the Civil Rights Remedy's legislative
history indicating that some circumstantial evidence of gender-motivation
beyond a bare allegation of domestic violence would be needed to sustain
a claim, the court's rejection of this case is unremarkable.
39. Id. at *9-10.
40. Id. at *10 (citing S. REP. No. 102-197, at 50 n.7 2 (1991) (referencing generally
accepted guidelines for identifying hate crimes as useful in analyzing gender-motivation)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. No. 98 C 2395, 1998 WL 673629 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 1998).
44. Id. at *6 (citing Mattison v. Click Corp. of America, Inc., 1998 WL 32597 (E.D.
Pa. 1998), and Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill. 1997)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Dolin v. West, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1351 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
[VOL. 6:265
Seeking Redress
Courts applying state anti-bias laws also have relied on circumstan-
tial evidence, such as derogatory comments, to assess whether a particular
case of domestic violence is "gender-motivated." For example, in State v.
Aboulez, 48 a Massachusetts court issued an injunction under that state's
anti-bias law after considering significant evidence of gender-
.• 49
motivation. While there was no written opinion in that case, affidavits
submitted by the defendant's wife and other former partners reflected a
pattern of repeated violence committed against them, combined with
evidence of misogynic epithets and other statements evincing stereotypi-
cal views of women.50
In addition to the evidence described above, domestic violence
cases may contain other indicia of gender bias. The coercion and control
that typify domestic violence frequently reflect men's attempts to ensure
that their partners conform to traditional gender roles.51 They may insist
that their partners stay home, dictate their manner of dress, and limit
their interactions with others. They may berate their partners if they
depart from traditional gender-specific roles such as cooking or cleaning,
and they often interfere with women's working lives, dramatically inhib-• 52
iting their independence. Similarly reflecting conduct that targets a
48. No. 94-0985H (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 1994) (complaint on file with the
Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
49. Id. at 1-2 (issuing injunction prohibiting batterer from taking various actions
against "any... woman who is a resident or visitor to the Commonwealth").
50. See Compl., State v. Aboulez, No. 94-0985H, (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 1994)
(on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law). Along with physical abuse, the
complaint alleged that the defendant called the women he was involved with and women
in general "whores," "bitches," "sluts," and "no good," and said things such as "you're
not as smart as me," and "you'll never be as smart as me." Id. at 8. He told one of the
women that she was "just hke all the rest of them, cheap ... easy," and said that women
in general were weaker and not as smart as men. Id. at 16. In several of his relation-
ships, he threatened to kill his partner if she ever left him, saw anyone else, or sought a
restraining order against him. Id. at 7 8, 16, 26, 35. He refused to allow the women to
leave their apartments alone and dictated how they should dress. Id. at 18, 26, 35. He
also stated that he had the right to beat a woman because she was his wife. Id. at 9. He
regularly forced his partners to engage in sexual intercourse against their will.Id. at T 9,
28.
51. See, e.g., NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN:
NEW INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS (1998); Evan Stark, Re-Presenting
Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973
(1995); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRI-
VATE VIOLENCE 36 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
52. See, e.g., CATHERINE T. KENNEY & KAREN R. BROWN, REPORT FROM THE FRONT
LINES: THE IMPACT OF VIOLENCE ON POOR WOMEN (1996); Martha F. Davis & Susan J.
Kraham, Protecting Women's Welfare in the Face of Violence, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1141,
1151-52 & nn.60-75 (1995); Jody Raphael, Prisoners of Abuse: Policy Implications of the
Relationship Between Domestic Violence and Wejfare Receipt, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 186
(1996); see also UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Domestic Violence: Prevalence
and Implications for Employment Among Welfare Recipients, GAO REp. TO CONGRESSIONAL
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woman's "femaleness," batterers may subject a woman to violence when
she is pregnant. 3 While not every instance of intimate violence may
reflect stereotypic gender roles, the few cases that address the question
confirm that discriminatory motivation in domestic violence cases can be
judicially cognizable.
B. Gender-bias in Sexual Assault Cases
Notwithstanding a debate about whether every act of rape or sexual
assault is gender-motivated analogous to that surrounding domestic vio-
lence, almost all courts evaluating whether rape or sexual assult were
"gender-motivated" under the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy reasoned
that sexual assault or other unwanted sexual conduct reflected gender-
motivation. Given the extent of debate about the issue, it is perhaps
surprising that most of these courts did not look beyond the allegation of
rape or sexual assault itself, apparently deeming it self-evident that such
crimes are inherently gender-motivated. One or two opinions, however,
suggested that the analysis might be more complex in cases involving
acquaintance rapes. Overall, these decisions reflect some advances in
judicial understanding of the connection between gender bias and sexual
assault, but also suggest that stereotypes still prevail.
Perhaps the most widely publicized VAWA civil rights sexual assault
case is United States v. Morrison, litigated in the lower courts as Brzonkala
v. Va. Polytechnic Institute.4 Notwithstanding the lower courts' different
COMMITTEES, 7 (Nov. 1998) (33% to 46% of women surveyed in five studies said their
partner prevented them from working entirely, and studies show that between 16% and
60% of battered women reported that their partner had discouraged them from working);
EDK ASSOCIATES, The Many Faces of Domestic Violence and Its Impact on the Workplace,
Prepared for the Body Shop, 4 (Sept. 1997) (close to 4 out of 10 women (37%) who have
experienced domestic violence report that the abuse caused such problems as lateness,
missed work, keeping a job, or career promotions); LouIsE LAURENCE & ROBERTA SPAL-
TER-ROTH, MEASURING THE COSTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THE
COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERVENTIONS 25 (1996) (showing that 60% of battered women
reported lateness at work due to abuse); Melanie Shepard & Ellen Spence, The Effect of
Battering on the Employment Status of Women, 3 AFFILIA 55, 58 (1988) (showing that one-
half of battered women reported harassment at work by their abusers, and one-quarter
had lost a job due, at least in part, to the effects of domestic violence); CONNIE STANLEY,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: AN OCCUPATIONAL IMPACT STUDY 17 (Tulsa, Oklahoma, July 27,
1992) (showing that 50% of battered women surveyed reported lost workdays, 60% had
been reprimanded, and 70% reported difficulty in performing their jobs, due to abuse).
53. See Schneider, supra note 51, at 150-51, 281-82 n.4. See also Patricia Horn,
Beating Back the Revolution: Domestic Violence's Economic Toll on Women, DOLLARS AND
SENSE, Dec. 1992, at 12 (recounting study suggesting that an estimated 25% to 40% of
battered women are assaulted by their batterers during pregnancy).
54. 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en
banc), aftd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000). The lawsuit was
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conclusions about the Civil Rights Remedy's constitutionality, each of
the courts that considered the case determined that Christy Brzonkala's
allegations that she was gang raped described a crime of violence that was
"gender-motivated" under the meaning of the statute."5 For example, the
trial court followed Congress's direction to evaluate the "totality of the
circumstances" and to apply criteria used to assess other forms of hate
56
crime . Accordingly, it found salient the fact that Brzonkala alleged that
the defendants were virtual strangers, that neither used a condom, and
that Morrison later made comments indicating his disrespect for57
women. Among the comments the court found significant was one
made after the third rape, when Morrison threatened Brzonkala by
stating, "You better not have any fucking diseases."" In the months
following the rape, Morrison announced publicly in the dormitory
dining hall that he "like[d] to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of
them." 9 While the trial court took pains to distinguish these allegations
from those of an acquaintance rape, which it postulated "could involve
a misunderstanding and is often less violent than stranger rape,' '60 it
concluded that the circumstantial evidence alleged reflected "gender
disrespect" and warranted upholding a claim of gender-motivation.61
originally brought by Christy Brzonkala, asserting Civil Rights Remedy claims against
defendants Morrison and Crawford, as well as a claim against Virginia Tech for violating
her rights under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which bars gender
discrimination in education. The Title IX claim was not before the Supreme Court and
was settled between the parties. The United States intervened as a party in the lawsuit to
defend the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Remedy.
55. In the district court, Judge Kiser concluded that Brzonkala's complaint stated a
VAWA civil rights claim, but struck down the law as unconstitutional, finding that
Congress lacked authority to enact the law under either the Commerce Clause or Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 801. The Fourth Circuit
panel, in a 2-1 decision, reversed on the constitutional issue, holding that Brzonkala had
stated a claim under the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy and that Congress constitutionally
exercised its Commerce Clause powers when it enacted the law. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d 949
(4th Cir. 1997). The panel decision was vacated, and, in a 7-4 en banc decision written by
Judge Luttig, the Fourth Circuit also held that Brzonkala had stated a VAWA civil rights
claim but that the law was unconstitutional under both the Commerce Clause and Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 889. The dissenting judges
would have upheld the law under the Commerce Clause and therefore did not address
the Section 5 argument, but they concurred that Brzonkala had stated a claim of gender-
motivation.
56. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 784.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 785.
59. Id.
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On appeal, a panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the claim based on similar reasoning, noting that a "gang rape itself con-
stitutes an attack of sufficient severity" to fit within the classic criteria for
assessing hate crimes, and that the acts were committed without provo-
62cation. The panel further relied on a concession by one of the assailants
during a college disciplinary hearing that Ms. Brzonkala twice told him
"no" before the alleged rape, and the fact that there was no other appar-
63
ent motive for the attack, such as robbery or theft. Like the trial court,
the appellate panel cited comments by one of the defendants during and
after the rape as further evidence of gender-motivation. Based on that
evidence, the court concluded that "[vjirtually all of the earmarks of
, 64
'hate crimes' are asserted here," and it upheld Brzonkala's claim. The en
banc panel similarly concluded that Brzonkala had stated a claim; how-
ever, it was less emphatic in its reasoning. Although the court agreed that
Morrison's comments supported an inference of gender-motivation, it
added the caveat that those allegations "do not necessarily compel the
conclusion that Morrison acted from animus toward women as a
class .... 65
While not as well-publicized as the Morrison case, a decision by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals most explicitly articulated the view that
sexual assault, and particularly rape, is inherently gender-biased. In
Schwenk v. Hartford, the court considered a charge of attempted rape of
a transsexual prison inmate by a prison guard. 6' After reasoning that
"gender-based animus" is present wherever a "strong emotional re-
sponse" to the victim's gender or sexual identity underlies the assault, the
court stated that rape and attempted rape are, sui generis, animated byS 68
gender-animus. The court seemed to presume that rape and sexual
assault are gender-motivated, but its reference to a "strong emotional
response" to the victim's gender identity raises the question whether
such an emotional response would be an additional required element of
the claim. One would hope that the court was not implying that a plain-
tiff would have to establish that the perpetrator's actions were based on
62. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 964.
63. Id. at 963.
64. Id.
65. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 830.
66. 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
67. Id. at 1203.
68. Id. at 1202-03. The court opined that it would be both impossible and unneces-
sary to determine whether particular rapes are due in part to gender-based animus, as
"the nature of the crime dictates a uniform, affirmative answer to the inquiry." Id. at
1203. The court in Schwenk went on to state that prison rape in particular occurs
"because of gender," due in part to the gender assignment associated with prison rapists
and their victims. Id. at 1203 n.14 (citations omitted).
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an emotional response in order to establish that sexual violence was gen-S 69
der-motivated.
A federal district court in Utah provided the most detailed explica-
tion, albeit in dicta, of why unwanted sexual contact is gender-motivated,
as contemplated by the VAWA civil rights statute. In McCann v. Rosquist,
70
the district court considered claims by several women that they were re-
peatedly sexually harassed and assaulted by the chiropractor for whom they
worked. Although the court rejected the women's claims because they
failed to establish the "crime of violence" element of the Civil Rights
Remedy,71 it opined that the claims would satisfy the "gender-
motivation" element, stating that:
[t]he notion that non-consensual sexually-oriented conduct
is actually amorous and therefore not invidiously discrinmi-
natory toward the victimized class is clearly wrong .... In
fact, the perception that a man is somehow less culpable in
taking inappropriate liberties with a member of the female
gender if his motivations are amorous, seems to be just the
type of "animus" that is a focus of concern in gender dis-
crimination. Regardless of the amorous intentions of the
perpetrator, non-consensual expressions of affection that
69. Another court evaluated a VAWA Civil Rights Remedy claim based on same-
sex sexual assault; however, it rejected the claim, finding no circumstantial evidence of
gender-bias. See Wilson v. Diocese of New York, No. 97 Civ. 2400 (JGK), 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2051, at *41 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 1998). While the Wilson court reached its
decision with virtually no analysis, the decision may reflect a presumed, though perhaps
incorrect, distinction between male-female and same-sex sexual assault. Whereas male-
female sexual assault may be treated as gender biased with virtually no analysis, this
decision indicates that same-sex sexual assault cases may not receive the same presump-
tion. Courts may require circumstantial evidence and other factual allegations showing
that discriminatory motivation was a factor. Such an approach would be similar to that
employed in some Title VII cases involving same sex sexual harassment. See generally
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75, 80-82 (1998); see also Katherine
M. Franie, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STANFORD L. Rav. 691 (1997)
(contrasting judicial treatment of same-sex versus opposite-sex sexual harassment cases).
70. 998 F. Supp. 1246, 1252-53 (D. Utah 1998).
71. Id. at 1252. Employing an analysis that flies in the face of empirical data on the
nature of sexual harassment at work, the district court determined that the sexual assaults
were unlikely to create a risk that force would be used because they allegedly took place
at work. Id. at 1152-53. Fortunately, that conclusion was rejected on appeal. McCann v.
Byron L. Rosquist, D.C., P.C., 185 F.3d 1113, 1116-21 (10th Cir. 1999) (reversing
district court and holding that forcible sexual abuse carries a substantial risk of physical
force), vacated and remanded for consideration in light of United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct
1740 (2000).
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rise to the nature of those alleged in this action are laden
72
with disrespect for women.
A federal court in Iowa took a slightly different approach but also
recognized the bias inherent in unwanted sexual advances. In Doe v.
Hartz,7 3 a case involving allegations of sexual assault of a parishioner by a
priest, the court undertook an examination of VAWA's legislative history
as part of its assessment of gender-motivation. It recognized that un-
wanted or unwelcome sexual advances are "demeaning and belittling,
and may reasonably be inferred to be intended to have that purpose or to
relegate another to an inferior status, even if the advances were also in-
tended to satisfy the actor's sexual desires .... , The court noted that
allegations of a sexual assault alone might not be enough to establish
gender-motivation under the VAWA civil rights statute, given the
legislative history requiring proof of discriminatory motivation. How-
ever, after analyzing Congress's directive to draw from other anti-
discrimination and hate crime paradigms, the court deemed a view that
unwanted sexual attention is "merely a 'signal of affection,'" a form of
"romantic paternalism., 76 The court rejected any such argument as re-
flecting the type of stereotype impermissible under equal protection
analysis, and concluded that unwanted sexual advances "relegate[]
women as a group to an inferior status without regard to their individual
qualities. 7 7 In its final analysis, the court found that the plaintiff had
adequately pled gender-motivation. 8
In several VAWA civil rights cases, sexual assaults in the workplace
were also found to satisfy the gender-motivation element of the statute.
Crediting circumstantial evidence similar to that used in other hate crime
cases, one court7 9 relied on the fact that a woman was raped at her work-
place by a "total stranger" who used sexual language and commented on
her figure and breasts, grabbed her hair, breasts, and buttocks, fondled
her breasts, buttocks and stomach, and kissed, pinched, and pursued her
after she expressed a lack of consent. 8° The court also noted the defen-
dant's history of making unwanted sexual advances towards women,
72. Id. at 1252-53.
73. 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th
Cir. 1998).
74. Id. at 1408.
75. Id. at 1406.
76. Id. at 1408 (citation omitted).
77. Id. (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973)).
78. Id. at 1408-09.
79. Jugmohan v. Zola, No. 98 Civ. 1509 (DAB), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1910,
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2000).
80 Id. at *10-11.
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which it found underscored the fact that his actions against the plaintiff
were motivated by a gender animus towards women.81
In other cases involving workplace sexual assaults, courts deemed
the sexual assault probative of gender-motivation, without requiring any
additional proof For example, an Illinois federal district court concluded
that a woman who alleged that her employer made inappropriate sexual
advances, including fondling, attempting to remove her clothing, grab-
bing her breasts, and assaulting and attempting to rape her, stated a
82VAWA civil rights claim. Another court found that allegations that a
male supervisor called a female employee a "dumb bitch" and later
shoved her to the ground would allow a reasonable jury to infer gender-
motivation.83 Similarly, two different courts concluded with virtually no
analysis that "sexual harassment of any kind" would satisfy VAWA's
84
statutory requirement for gender-motivation.
Courts' determinations that rape and sexual assault are probative of
gender-motivation are not surprising given the treatment of rape in other
sex discrimination cases. For example, in cases asserting sexual harassment
in the workplace, a single incident of rape or sexual assault can be
enough to warrant a court's conclusion that the act was "because of sex,"
as that term is defined under Title VII. 8s Since the VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy's gender-motivation element tracks Title VII's requirement that
the conduct be committed "because of sex," and because Congress spe-
cifically directed courts to draw on Title VII in evaluating VAWA civil
rights claims, the analogy is a logical extension of existing caselaw.
In contrast with these decisions, dicta by the Brzonkala trial court
suggests that acquaintance rape cases might fare differently from cases of
stranger rape. Citing a concern that "date rape could involve a misun-
derstanding and is often less violent than stranger rape," the court
theorized that:
81. Id. at *11. See also Mattison v. Click Corp. of America, No. 97-CV-2736, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 720, *24-25 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (similarly recognizing the bias inherent in
unwanted sexual overtures at work).
82. Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 541 (N.D. II. 1997).
83. Crisonino v. New York City Housing Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385, 391 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); accord Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452, 474 (DR.I. 1999) (finding allegations of
rape of a graduate student by a professor, along with lewd comments, threats of deporta-
tion, and the lack of any other motive, to be gender-motivated).
84. Truong v. Smith, No. 98-B-332, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21327, slip op. at 6 (D.
Colo. April 13, 1999) (cited with approval in Blair v. All Stars Sports Cabaret, 87 F.
Supp. 2d 1133, 1137 (D. Colo. 2000)).
85. See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 1995); Brock v.
United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1423-1424 (9th Cir. 1995); Yaba v. Roosevelt, 961 F.
Supp. 611, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); AI-Dabbagh v. Greenpeace, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 1105,
1110-11 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Campbell v. Kansas State Univ., 780 F. Supp. 755, 762 (D.
Kan. 1991).
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[d]ate rape could also involve a situation where a man's
sexual passion provokes the rape by decreasing the man's
control . . . [D]ate rape could involve in part disrespect for
the victim as a person, not as a woman; in date rape the
16perpetrator knows the victim's personality to some extent.
Other courts criticized that reasoning as reflecting sweeping gener-
alizations, contrary to Congress's direction to analyze each case on a case-
by-case basis.87 In addition, the trial court's position ignores the essential
point that forced sexual contact in the name of passion or personality
often supports, rather than refutes, a claim of gender-motivation because
88it shows a disrespect for women. It also contradicts research indicating
that acquaintance rapes frequently are premeditated and are predicated on
discriminatory biases about male entitlement to coerce sexual relations
with women.8 9 Nonetheless, the Brzonkala trial court decision illustrates
the extent to which stereotypical attitudes toward acquaintance rape
persist, and suggests that civil rights cases asserting that such assaults re-
flect gender-motivation may be more difficult to sustain.
Several VAWA Civil Rights Remedy cases were dismissed for fail-
ing to state a claim of gender-motivation. What is striking about those
decisions is that none of them rested on a judgment that the plaintifl'
proffered evidence of gender-motivation was insufficient. Instead, each
of those cases rejected VAWA Civil Rights Remedy claims because they
lacked any allegation or evidence of gender-motivation. For example,
several courts rejected claims that referred to evidence of assault, but
contained no allegations that the assault was gender-biased. 9° In one such
86. 935 F. Supp. at 785.
87. See Anisimov, 982 F. Supp. at 541 (critiquing the Brzonkala trial court's "broad
characterizations of rape".). See also Braden v. Piggly Wiggly, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1362,
n.4 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (critiquing the Brzonkala trial court's distinction between stranger
rape and date rape, stating that "rape is rape").
88. See McCann, 998 F. Supp. at 1252-53. See also supra note 71 and accompanying
text.
89. See, e.g., David Lisak, Ph.D., Interview with a Rapist: Transcript from a Study of
Acquaintance Rapists (unpublished report, U. Mass. Boston, Clinical Psychology Dept.)
(on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law) (documenting "techniques" used by
"unincarcerated" rapists to target women for invitations to fraternity parties at which they
would ply the women with alcoholic beverages, take them to predesignated rooms, and
have sexual relations notwithstanding the women's objections).
90. See, e.g., Dolin v. West, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1343 (M.D. Fla. 1998), affld, No. 98-
3847, slip. op. (11th Cir. Jan. 11, 2000); Glendora v. Pinkerton Sec. & Detective Serv-
ices, 25 F. Supp. 2d 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 985 F.
Supp. 1288, 1300 (D. Kan. 1997); Harris v. Franklin-Williamson Human Services, Inc.,
97 F. Supp. 2d 892, 907 (S.D. Ill. 2000).
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case, the court noted that "the record is replete with testimony that [the
parties] did not like each [other] because of their respective positions
regarding Unions, not because of gender. ' These cases reflect the un-
remarkable view that VAWA civil rights allegations asserting violence by
a man against a woman cannot be sustained absent some other indicationS 92
that the act was in some way gender-motivated.
CONCLUSION
While many cases brought under the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy
focused in large part on the law's constitutionality, others explicated the
type of proof that would be required to establish gender-motivation.
These decisions brought to light the parallels between gender-motivated
crimes and other hate crimes. Although the law enacted in 1994 no
longer is available to plaintiffs, the Morrison decision rejecting the law's
constitutionality should not obscure Congress's important recognition of
the discriminatory nature of these crimes. Cases addressing the meaning
of gender-motivation adjudicated during the VAWA Civil Rights Rem-
edy's six-year history undoubtedly will serve as persuasive authority
under alternative statutory frameworks as women continue to hold per-
petrators accountable in order to recover from the harm that results from
gender-based violence.
91. Harris, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 907.
92. One exception is the somewhat anomalous case of Brandon v. Piggly Wiggly, 4
F. Supp. 2d 1357 (M.D. Ala. 1998). The court there seemingly accepted that allegations
of sexual violence may alone be "indicative of gender animus" and therefore sufficient to
satisfy the VAWA civil rights gender-motivation element. Id. at 1362. Nonetheless, the
court rejected the plaintiff's claim because it interpreted the VAWA civil rights statute to
require that the predicate felony offense itself show proof of gender animus as one of its
elements. Id. In addition to lacking any legal support whatsoever, that analysis is illogical
because felony statutes generally do not require proof of gender-motivation as an exphc-
itly enumerated element. Fortunately, the court allowed the plaintiff to amend her
complaint with particular allegations supporting her claim of gender-motivation. No
other court has adopted this, or any similar, analysis.
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